Asia and Pacific Law by Doyle, Michael et al.
Asia and Pacific Law
MICHAEL DOYLE, PAMELA A. FULLER, BEOMSU KIM, IHAKsoo Ko, MURZALI ALl,
NORWEN SHAHREDZA GHAzALI, TIM J. O'BRIEN, SNEHAL PATIL, AJIT SHARMA,
BEN DOMINIC R. YAP AND ALBERT VINCENT Y. Yu CHANG*
The Asia-Pacific Committee covers the Asia-Pacific region, including Afghanistan, Aus-
tralia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, the Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Japan,
North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. This article highlights se-
lected 2006 legal developments in India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam.
I. India"
In 2006, India continued with its rapid economic growth by enacting significant legisla-
tion and making policy decisions aimed at harmonizing its laws with international regimes
and further liberalizing the Indian economy. Certain key legal developments of particular
interest to the international community are highlighted below.
A. ELECTRONIC FILING OF CORPORATE DOcuMEirs
Effective May 29, 2006, the Companies (Amendment) Act, 20061 came into force, al-
lowing companies to undertake online filing of statutory documents with the Registrar of
Company offices.2 To facilitate maintenance of electronic records, the Amendment incor-
porates the provisions of the Information Technology Act, 20003 into the Companies Act,
* Haksoo Ko is Of Counsel at Shin & Kim, Seoul, Korea, and is a Professor of Law at Yonsei University
College of Law, Seoul, Korea; he solicited and compiled submissions for this article. All other authors are
identified at the beginning of their respective contributions.
** Snehal Patil and Ajit Sharma prepared this section. Snehal Patil is an associate with with Thelen Reid
Brown Raysman & Steiner LLP at San Francisco, Calif. Ajit Sharma is a Master of Laws student at The
George Washington University Law School, Washington D.C.
1. Full text of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 200, is available at http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryWeb-
site/dca/actsbills/pdf/CompAmendmentAct_2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
2. See § 610B(l)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956 (inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2006)
[hereinafter Companies Act].
3. Full text of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?
tfnm=200021 (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
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1956. 4 These provisions were inserted to further the major e-governance initiative of the
Ministry of Company Affairs, known as the MCA-21 project.5
The Amendment has also made it mandatory for existing and prospective directors to
obtain a Director Identification Number (DIN), while prohibiting companies from ap-
pointing or re-appointing individuals as directors without valid DINs.6
B. AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (SEBI)
DISCLOSURE & INVESTOR PROTECTION (DIP) GUIDELINES, 2000
During 2006, the SEBI made four key amendments to the SEBI DIP Guidelines, 2000. 7
1. Provision for Qualified Institutions Placements
In May 2006, the SEBI introduced Chapter XITIA to the SEBI DIP Guidelines, 2000
providing an additional mode for listed companies to raise funds from domestic markets in
the form of Qualified Institutions Placement (QIP). Under these provisions, a company
whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange having nationwide trading terminals
and is complying with the prescribed requirements of minimum public shareholding of
the listing agreement will be eligible to raise funds in the domestic market by placing
securities with Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs).9
Only equity shares and any securities other than warrants that are convertible into or
exchangeable with equity shares (specified securities) may be issued through QIP.10 The
specified securities must be made fully paid up at the time of allotment" and may be
issued only to QIBs, who must not be promoters or related, directly or indirectly, to
promoters of the issuer. 12
Each placement of the specified securities issued through QIP must be on private place-
ment basis and in compliance with the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956. A mini-
mum of 10 percent of the securities in each placement must be allotted to mutual funds. 13
For each placement, there must be at least two allottees for an issue of size up to Indian
Rupees 2.5 billion and at least five allottees for an issue size in excess of Indian Rupees 2.5
billion. Further, no single allottee shall be allotted in excess of 50 percent of the issue
4. See Companies Act, supra note 2, §§ 610B-E. These provisions relate to the authentication of elec-
tronic documents, electronic service and delivery of documents, maintenance of electronic records, online
inspection of documents, and electronic payment of statutory fees.
5. MCA-21 is India's largest e-governance initiative of the Ministry of Company Affairs (MCA), in collab-
oration with Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., to provide electronic access to information, online submission of
forms, and delivery of services to all the stakeholders of the MCA in the 21st century.
6. See Companies Act, 1956, §§ 253 (proviso), 266A-G; inserted by the Companies Act, supra note 2.
DINs can now be obtained by filing online applications available at http://www.mca.gov.in.
7. The full text of the SEBI (DIP) Guidelines, 2000, updated up to October 18, 2006, is available at http://
www.sebi.gov.in/acts/ipguidelines.pdf.
8. Inserted vide SEBI Circular No.SEBIICFD/DIL/DIP/22/2006/8/5, dated May 8, 2006, is available at
http://www.sebi.gov.in/ndex.jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&sec-id=25&sub-sec-id=25.
9. See SEBI (DIP) Guidelines, 2000, cl. 13A.I.
10. Id. at cl. 13A.l.1.
11. Id. atcl. 13A.3.3.
12. Id. at cl. 13A.2.4.
13. Id. at cl. 13A.2.2.
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size.14 Investors will not be allowed to withdraw their bids or applications after closure of
the issue.' 5 The floor price of the specified securities will be determined on a basis similar
to that for Global Depository Receipt or foreign Currency Convertible Bond issues and
will be subject to adjustment in case of corporate actions, such as stock splits, rights issue,
bonus issue, etc. 16
The aggregate funds that may be raised through QIPs in one financial year cannot
exceed five times of the net worth of the issuer at the end of its previous financial year.' 7
Further, there must be a gap of at least six months between each placement in case of
multiple placements of specified securities pursuant to authority of the same shareholders'
resolution.18
2. Changes in Venture Capital Funds Lock-in Periods for IPOs19
On October 16, 2006, the SEBI amended the SEBI (DIP) Guidelines, 2000 to clarify
that the benefit of the "no lock-in period" for shares held by Venture Capital Funds
(VCFs) and Foreign Venture Capital Investors (FVCIs) in a company prior to making an
initial public offering would be limited to (1) shares held by the SEBI registered VCFs/
FVCIs for a period of at least one year at the time of filing of draft prospectus with the
SEBI, and (2) shares issued to the SEBI registered VCFs/FVCIs upon conversion of con-
vertible instruments during the period of one year prior to the date of filing draft prospec-
tus with the SEBI, provided that the period of holding such convertible instruments as
fully paid up, together with the period of holding shares resulting from conversion, by the
VCFs and FVCIs, is at least one year from the date of filing the draft prospectus with the
SEBI.20
3. Restrictions on Pre-Issue Publicity by Issuer Companies2'
Effective October 18, 2006, every issuer company will have to follow certain guidelines
concerning "Restrictions on Pre-issue Publicity" from the time the issuer company's
board approves the issue until the actual allotment of shares in the issue. The restrictions,
inter alia, require an issuer company to ensure that its publicity is consistent with its past
practices and does not contain projections, estimates, or any information extraneous to the
offer document filed with the SEBI. The issuer company is also required to make prompt,
true, and fair disclosure of all material developments taking place during the above period,
relating to its business and securities and also relating to the business and securities of its
14. Id. at cl. 13A.8.1.
15. Id. at cl. 13A.2.5.
16. Id. at cl. 13A.4.1.
17. Id. at cl. 13A.9.1.
18. Id. at cl. 13A.6.3.
19. Inserted vide SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/23/2006/16/10, dated Oct. 16, 2006, is
available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jspcontentDisp=SubSection&sec_id=25&sub-secid=25.
20. See SEBI (DIP) Guidelines, 2000, cl. 4.14.2(i). Prior to the Amendment, pre-issue shares of an unlisted
company making an initial public offering were not required to be locked in, if the same were held by VCFs
or FVCIs registered with the SEBI.
21. Id. at cl. 9.1.14. Inserted vide SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/24/2006/18/l0, dated October
18, 2006, is available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp= SubSection&secid=25&subsec_id=
25.
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subsidiaries, group companies, etc., which may have a material effect on the issuer com-
pany by issuing public notices in newspapers.
4. Guidelines for Issuers of Indian Depository Receipts22
In April 2006, the SEBI issued certain guidelines to be followed by an Indian Deposi-
tory Receipts (IDRs) issuer for coming out with such an issue. The guidelines, which are
set forth in the new Chapter VIA to the SEBI (DIP) Guidelines, 2000, clarify that nonres-
ident Indians and foreign institutional investors cannot purchase or posses IDRs without
the prior permission of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 23
The guidelines also set forth a minimum issue size of Indian Rupees 500 million24 and
stipulate that only companies with a good track record in the securities market that are
listed in their home country and are not otherwise prohibited to issue securities by any
regulatory body will be allowed to raise funds. 25
C. AMENDMENTS To THE SEBI (FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS) (FPH)
REGULATIONS, 1995
In June 2006, the SEBI enacted the SEBI (FII) (Amendment) Regulations, 2006,26
which amended the SEBI (FII) Regulations, 199527 by, inter alia, reducing the validity
period of a registration certificate for FIls from five years to three years 28 and increasing
the registration fee from US$5,000 to US$10,000 and the renewal fee from US$1,000 to
US$2,000.29
In September 2006, the SEBI again amended the SEBI (FI1) Regulations, 1995 vide the
SEBI (FIl) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2006,30 whereby it expanded the list of
foreign entities and funds eligible for registration as FMs. The amended Regulations now
permit foreign established or incorporated insurance companies, reinsurance companies,
international or multilateral organizations or their agencies, foreign governmental agency,
foreign central banks, and investment managers, or investment advisors proposing to
make investments in India on behalf of broad based funds or its proprietary funds to be
registered as a FlI.31
22. Inserted vide SEBI Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DILIDIP/20/2006/3/4, dated April 3, 2006, is available at
http://web.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2006/cir092006.html.
23. See SEBI (DIP) Guidelines, 2000, cl. 6A.3(1).
24. Id. at cl. 6A.4.
25. Id. at cl. 6A.2.
26. Full text of the SEBI Circular No.SEBTLAD/DOP/69520/2006, dated June 26, 2006, is available at
http J/www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&sec - id=25&sub sec-id=25.
27. Full text of the SEBI (FII) Regulations, 1995, updated through May 3, 2004, is available at http://www.
sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?.
28. See SEBI (FII) Regulations, 1995, reg. 8.
29. Id. at Second Schedule.
30. Full text of the SEBI Notification No. S.O. 1332(E), dated Aug. 21, 2006, is available at http://www.
sebi.gov.in/acts/famend.pdf.
31. See SEBI (FII) Regulations, 1995, reg. 6(1)(d)(i)(i-a), (ii).
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D. LIBERALIZATION OF OVERSEAS INVESTMENT UNDER THE E41IPLOYEE STOCK
OPTION SCHEME
Effective April 15, 2006,32 the RBI has allowed authorized foreign exchange dealers to
handle remittances abroad for acquiring shares under stock option plans, provided that the
dealer verifies that: (1) the foreign issuer owns at least 51 percent of the India subsidiary
whose employees/directors are being offered stock options, (2) the shares under the plan
are being offered by the foreign issuer globally on an uniform basis, and (3) the India
subsidiary files an annual return with the RBI through authorized dealers giving details of
remittances, beneficiaries, etc.
33
The RBI has also granted a general permission to foreign companies to repurchase the
shares issued to their Indian employees/directors under the stock option plan provided
that: (1) the shares were issued in accordance with the requirements specified above, (2)
the shares are being repurchased in terms of the initial offer document, and (3) the India
subsidiary files an annual return with the RBI through authorized dealers giving details of
remittances, beneficiaries, etc.34
E. GUIDELINES FOR REAL ESTATE MUTUAL FUNDS
In June 2006, the SEBI approved certain guidelines for Real Estate Mutual Funds
(REMFs) permitting them to invest directly in real estate properties in India. 35 REMF
schemes will also be permitted to invest in: (1) mortgage (housing lease) backed securities,
(2) equity shares/bonds/debentures of listed and unlisted companies, which deal in proper-
ties and also undertake property development, and (3) other securities.
The schemes must initially operate as close-ended schemes and must be compulsorily
listed on the stock exchanges. Their net asset values will have to be declared daily.
REMFs are required to appoint a custodian, certified by the SEBI, to carry on the busi-
ness of custodian of securities for the safe keeping of tide of real estate properties held by
REMFs.
32. See RBI Circular No. RBI/2005-06/353, dated April 5, 2006, is available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/
rdocs/notification/PDFs/69708.pdf.
33. Prior to the notification, foreign exchange dealers were permitted to allow remittances, without any
monetary limit, where the foreign issuer held at least a 51% stake in the Indian company, whether directly or
indirectly (i.e., through a special purpose vehicle or a step down subsidiary) where such remittances were
made directly by the foreign issuer offering shares under the stock option plan. See Notification No.
FEMA. 120/RB-2004, reg. 22(2), dated July 7, 2004, available at http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BSFemaNoti-
fications.aspx?Id=2126 (for previous regulations).
34. Previously, prior RBI permission was required to repurchase any shares issued by the foreign issuer
under the stock option plan.
35. Press Release, SEBI, No. PR-166/2006, SEBI Board Approves (1) Guidelines for Real Estate Mutual
Funds and (2) Changes in Venture Capital Fund Lock-In Period for IPOs (June 26, 2006), available at http://
www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&secid=25&subsecid=2 5.
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F. MovE TowARDs A FULLER CAPrrIAL AccouNT CONVERTIBILITY
The RBI-appointed Committee on Fuller Capital Account Convertibility submitted its
report on July 31, 2006.36 The Committee, while considering fuller capital account con-
vertibility, incidentally observed that though the overall regime had undergone a signifi-
cant degree of liberalization, in practice, some regulations relating to an earlier period of
tight controls continued to remain, giving rise to a disconnect between the regulatory
intent and the procedure in use. Pursuant to the Committee's recommendations, the RBI
has convened an internal task force to re-examine the extant regulations and make recom-
mendations to remove the operational impediments in the path of liberalization already in
place. The task force was expected to complete its work by December 4, 2006.
37
G. SIMPLIFICATION OF SPECIAL EcONOMIC ZONES
The Special Economic Zones Act (SEZ), 2005,38 came into force on February 10, 2006.
The legislation aims to provide a duty-free environment,39 generate additional economic
activity, promote the export of goods and services, promote investment from domestic and
foreign sources, and create employment opportunities. 4°1 The SEZs Rules, 2006,41 issued
pursuant to the SEZ Act, have drastically simplified procedures by providing minimum
documentation for various activities of a unit, and a single window clearance facility on
matters relating to central and state governments.
42
H. HARMONIZATION OF PATENT LA\WS
On May 5, 2006, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry notified the Patent (Amend-
ment) Rules, 2006,4 3 which have amended various provisions of the Patent Rules, 2003.44
Under the new provisions, patent applications are to be compulsorily published within
one month after expiration of the statutory period of eighteen months and, in the case of a
request for early publication, within one month from the date of such request.
45
Definitive time frames have also been prescribed for various functions performed by the
patent offices. Accordingly, it is mandatory that patent applications be referred to an
examiner within one month of filing of a request for examination, 46 and the controller is
36. Full text of the Committee on Fuller Capital Account Convertibility Report is available at http://www.
rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?fromdate=0
9 /1/06&Secld=21&SubSecld=O (last visited
Mar. 5, 2007).
37. As of Dec. 13, 2006, the task force had not submitted its report.
38. Full text of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 is available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/SEZ%20
Act.,%202005.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
39. See SEZ Act, 2005, First Schedule, §§ 7, 26.
40. Id. § 5.
41. Full text of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 is available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/sez-rules
2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
42. See SEZ Act, 2005, ch. V, §§ 13-25; SEZ Rules, 2006, § 5(5)(h).
43. Full text of the Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2006 is available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/
patent_rules_2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
44. Full text of the Patents Rules, 2003 is available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent-re-03.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
45. See R. 7 of the Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2006.
46. Id. at R. 8(b)(i).
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required to make a decision on the report of the examiner within one month of its submis-
sion.47 The time for granting of permission to file patent applications abroad has been
reduced to a mere twenty-one days as opposed to the previous three months. 4 On the
other hand, timelines available to applicants and the public have been increased. For ex-
ample, the time for making a request for examination has been extended from thirty-six
months to forty-eight months, 49 the time for filing a pre-grant opposition has been ex-
tended from three months to six months,50 and the time for meeting requirements of the
first examination report has been increased to twelve months. 51
The patent administration has also been decentralized, with the Patent Office branches
at Delhi, Mumbai, and Chennai being allowed to undertake registration of patent agents,
filing of patents outside India, revocation of patents, and amendment of complete specifi-
cations on directions from the central government in cases relating to atomic energy.5 2
II. Japan*
In 2006, Japan continued along its propitious path of legal reform by enacting and
implementing statutes aimed at a broad range of areas, including Japan's emerging market
for corporate control, corporate governance, financial instruments, business entity forma-
tion, mergers and acquisitions, and, perhaps most significantly, privatization of Japan Post,
Japan's $3 trillion postal system that has long housed not only government-operated mail
and delivery services, but also one-third of Japan's household savings and life insurance
policies. The policy goals underlying these reforms center around the need for Japan to
ensure its apparent recovery from its fifteen-year recession and to enable Japanese compa-
nies to better compete in the global marketplace. Also, in September 2006, Japan's charis-
matic Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, stepped down, leaving some to wonder whether
Koizumi's legacy of structural reforms will endure, or whether Japan will revert to its old
ways of managed competition, pork barrel politics, amakudari,5 3 and practices discourag-
ing the inbound foreign investment that Japan so desperately needs.54
47. Id. at R. 8(b)(ii).
48. Id. at R. 14.
49. Id. at R. 8(a).
50. Id. at R. 11(a).
51. Id. at R. 8(d).
52. Id. at R. 2.
* Pamela A. Fuller prepared this section; she is a New York-based attorney specializing in international
taxation and cross-border investments.
53. Amakudari, which literally means "descent from heaven," refers to an entrenched corporate norm in-
volving the implicit agreement by firms to hire retiring bureaucrats as senior executives once the bureaucrats
descend from their government positions. There is an implicit understanding that the former bureaucrat will
garner advantageous government treatment for his new employer. See EDwARt) J. LINCOLN, ARTI IIRITIC
JAPAN-TiO SLOW PACE OF ECONOAic REFORM 48-49, 79, 104-06, 149, 185-86, 149-50 (2001). "At least
until the mid-1990s, concepts such as group consciousness, amae by a paternalistic government, and strong
government-private personal relationships reinforced by the practice of amakudari played a role in shaping
deregulation." Id. at 150.
54. Because Japan's population is aging so rapidly, Japan needs more foreign investment to sustain its gross
domestic product. In 2002, Prime Minister Koizuni set the goal of doubling foreign direct investment by the
year 2007; however, this appears highly unlikely, especially in light of the government's decision to delay the
effective date of a controversial provision in the 2005 Companies Law sanctioning cross-border triangular
mergers as an acquisition technique. The provision sparked fears-arguably unfounded-that it would trig-
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When Koizumi was elected Prime Minister in 2001, Japan's financial system was para-
lyzed with bad bank loans and a seemingly moribund economy. In September 2006,
Koizumi left the new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, a different Japan-one with rehabili-
tated banks, a promising economy, and a more receptive attitude toward market-based and
corporate governance reforms. Koizumi's legacy is threefold. First, he created a blueprint
for future leaders on how to centralize power. 5  Second, Koizumi was able to resolve the
banking crisis by insisting on a greater measure of market discipline.56 Third, Koizumi
was able to convince a majority of the public that, to sustain Japan's future economic
growth, Japan's quasi-socialist financial system needed to be greatly downsized and mod-
ernized, and a high percentage of Japanese households' portfolios needed to move from
government guaranteed savings deposits to risk-based investments in the private sector.5 7
Between late June 2005 and 2006, Japan's Diet (national legislature) enacted three ma-
jor pieces of legislation to accomplish the goal of transforming savings into investments
and to infuse market-based principles into Japan's financial system. These mammoth leg-
islative reforms include: (1) the new Financial Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL),
which was adopted into law in June 2006;58 (2) the new Companies Law,5 9 which was
ger a spate of foreign hostile takeovers. In late 2006, the government set a new goal of doubling foreign
direct investment by 2010.
55. Unlike his predecessors, Koizumi was able to exploit several political tools created by legislative amend-
ments in the 1990s, including: (1) U.S.-style legislative districts designed to reduce factionalism, (2) a new
cabinet ministry called the Cabinet Office, and (3) a new body called the Council on Economic and Fiscal
Policy. Koizumi transformed the Economic Council into a powerful executive committee with which to
spearhead and push through legislative reforms. See Sebastian Moffett, New Blueprint-Koizumi's Success
charts the Path to Japan's Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2006, at Al.
56. In 2002, Japan's banks-long accustomed to government bail-outs when they routinely became over-
extended by propping up cadaver companies-were ordered to halve their bad debts by 2005. Some banks
failed-once an unthinkable occurrence in postwarJapan. However, the tough-love approach infused market
principles into the banking system and proved critical to Japan's economic recovery.
57. Nearly 51% of Japanese households' financial portfolios are held in cash and deposits, as opposed to
just 18.5% in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and investment trusts. By contrast, U.S. households' portfolios
average 13.5% in cash and deposits and 53% in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc., while German households
average 35% in cash and deposits and 33.4% in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc. See FINANCIAL SERVICES
AGENCY, JAPAN, NEW LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION-FINANCIAL INSTRU-
MENTS AND EXCHANGE LAW 3 (2006), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fie/2006101O.pdf.
58. Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, Law No. 65 of 2006 [hereinafter FIEL]. The FIEL, which is
slated to take effect incrementally between July 2006 and April 2008, replaces Japan's old Securities and
Exchange Law, changing its name to the FIEL. The FIEL, abolishes four statutes and amends eighty-nine
different laws-portions of which are being consolidated into the new FIEL. The FIEL (1) regulates a much
broader class of securities and financial instruments than the old SEL; (2) imposes tougher penalties for fraud,
disclosure violations, and market abuse; (3) contains more explicit parameters for conducting takeover bids,
including a mandatory bid provision; and (4) imposes much more stringent (and controversial) disclosure
requirements on marketers of financial products. For a detailed discussion of the FIEL, see an article in this
volume of The International Lawyer: Pamela A. Fuller, International Securities and Capital Markets, Section
VI, Japan, 41 IN-r'L LAW. - (2007).
59. Kaisha Ho (Companies Law), Law No. 86 of 2005 [hereinafter Japan Companies Law]. The new
statute, passed by the Diet on June 29, 2005, along with an accompanying Coordination Law, constitutes the
most extensive revision of Japan's Commercial Code since World War 11. The new legislation broadly
amends and integrates several existing laws covering Japan's various business entities, including rules applica-
ble to their incorporation, their internal governance, and their power to flexibly engage in M&A transactions.
See Pamela A. Fuller, Asia and Pacific Law, Section I, Japan, 40 INT'L LAW. 515, 521-523 (2006); Pamela Ann
Fuller, International Mergers and Acquisitions, Section XII, Japan, 40 INTr'L LAW. 311, 325-328 (2006) (for an
overview of the new Japan Companies Law provisions).
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enacted in 2005 and became. effective in May 2006 (except for a controversial triangular
merger provision slated to take effect in May 2007);60 and (3) enactment of a package of
laws requiring Japan's largest state-subsidized enterprise, Japan Post, be privatized over a
ten-year period stretching from 2007 to 2017 (Privatization Act).61 Although the enact-
ment of the FIEL and new Companies Law is expected to go a long way toward Koizumi's
goal of moving savings into investments, the successful privatization of Japan's mammoth
postal institutions, which would liberate nearly 200 trillion yen of personal savings, would
likely prove an even more critical factor in creating more robust financial markets-not
only in Japan, but in international markets as well.
Prime Minister Koizumi staked his political future on passage of the Privatization Act
when, after Parliament's initial refusal to pass the legislation, Koizumi dissolved the lower
house and called for a snap election on September 11, 2005, turning the election into a
virtual referendum on privatizing Japan Post. Koizumi, whose motto became "the private
sector can do what it can do," won the de facto referendum by a landslide, with many
privatization defectors ousted from their seats by the voters. The Privatization Act was
passed into law the following month, and now the process of implementing the Act-by
hammering out the details, guidelines, and cabinet orders, and by making appointments
and establishing procedures-will begin. The actual implementation of the Act will de-
termine whether privatization will be authentic. The question remains whether Koizumi's
successor, Prime Minister Abe, can continue to hold off the entrenched opponents of
privatization.
60. The controversial provision, adopted in Japan's 2005 Companies Law, expands the categories of per-
missible consideration in triangular mergers to include cash, bonds, and shares of foreign corporations. This
new provision will permit a Japanese target corporation to merge into a Japanese subsidiary of a foreign
corporation with the target's shareholders receiving as consideration the acquiring foreign parent's stock and
a limited percentage of cash or bonds. The amendment thus makes it easier and less expensive for foreign
corporations to acquire Japanese companies, and to buy out any dissenting shareholders. But this very possi-
bility is still generating a lot of resistance by Japan's powerful business lobby due to concerns that the provi-
sion will make foreign triangular mergers too easy to execute. Amid widespread fears of a sudden surge in
foreign hostile takeovers of Japanese companies, Japan's legislature postponed the effective date of the for-
eign-merger provision to 2007-a move that has been disparaged by foreign business interests as too protec-
tive and discriminatory. At the end of 2006, there were calls to delay its effective date even further. Mariko
Sanchanta, Demand for Tough Line on Share Swaps, FINANCIAL TtWES, Nov. 22, 2006, at 30. Even when
foreign triangular mergers become legal under Japanese law in May 2007, they are not likely to become a
popular acquisition technique unless Japan's tax law is also amended to make them tax deferred to the target's
shareholders, which is the tax treatment accorded such transactions by many of Japan's trading parmers,
including the United States. See, e.g., U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.367(a)-3(c); 1.367(a)-3(d)(3), Ex. 5 (1998).
61. The Privatization Act is known in Japan as "Yusei Min-ei-ka Kanren Roppou," which means "the Laws
related to Privatization of the Postal Services." The Privatization Act is comprised of six separate statutes
including: (1) Yubin mineikaho [Japan Postal Services Privatization Law], Law No. 97 of 2005; (2) Nihon
yusei kabushiki-gaishaho IJapan Postal Services Holding Company Law], Law No. 98 of 2005; (3) Yubin jigyo
kabushiki-gaishaho [Japan Postal Delivery Services Company Law], Law No. 99 of 2005; (4) Yubinkyoku
kabushiki-gaishaho [Japan Post Office Company Law], Law No. 100 of 2005; (5) Dokuritsu gyosei hojin
yubin chokin, Kan'i seimei hoken kanri kikoho [Law for the Independent Administration of the Public Cor-
poration to Manage Postal Savings/Postal Life Insurance], Law No. 101 of 2005; (6) Yusei min'eika ho to no
shiko ni tomonau kankei horitsu no seibi to ni kansuru horitsu [Law Relating to Improvements, Etc., of
Relevant Laws Accompanied by Enforcement of the Postal Privatization Law], Law No. 102 of 2005.
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A. THE WORLD'S BIGGEST SAVINGS BANK: JAPAN POST
Japan Post is easily the world's largest financial institution. It not only operates Japan's
sprawling post offices and mail delivery system, but also runs the world's largest private
savings bank and life insurance company, accounting for 30 percent of Japan's individual
savings, 40 percent of Japan's life insurance market, and 2 5 percent of all personal assets in
Japan. Together, these assets are valued at US$3.45 trillion.62 In all, Japan Post holds
assets of approximately 330 trillion yen, which is approximately 65 percent of Japan's gross
domestic product,63 and easily more than any other private bank. Beginning in 2007,
more than 200 trillion yen (US$1.7 trillion) will be available to be removed from Japan's
postal institutions. Full privatization of an entity the size ofJapan Post will have profound
implications, not only for Japan's financial system, but for the entire world. Already,
many global asset managers, investment banks, and marketers of financial products are
jockeying for position to take advantage of what promises to be an impending flood of
prospective customers' money into the private marketplace. 64 Given its colossal size,
there is little wonder why the dispute over Japan Post's privatization continues, with the
debate now focused on the sufficiency, implementation, and future effect of the 2005
Privatization Act. Some have questioned whether Koizumi's dream will ever be realized.
B. LMPLEMENTING THE 2005 PRIVATIZATION AcT
Initial implementation of the 2005 Privatization Act began in January 2006 with the
formation of a new oversight company and appointment of its board members, who are
considering various business models and guidelines to carryout the ten-year privatization
plan. Specifically, Article 5 of the Privatization Act mandates that on October 1, 2007,
Japan Post-a quasi-public corporation 65 heavily dependent on interest free loans and
government subsidies-be divided into four separate corporate subsidiaries of a new hold-
ing company, which will be called Japan Postal Services Holding Corporation UPSHC).
Japan Post's four main businesses-mail delivery, postal savings, postal insurance, and its
network of nearly 25,000 post office branches-will each be dropped into one of the four
62. Japan Post, Postal Services in Japan 2004: Annual Report, 2004; Japanese Bankers Assoc., Financial
Statements of All Banks, 2004; Insurance Research Institute, Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan,
2004.
63. Thomas F. Cargill & Hal S. Scott, Postal Savings in Japan and Mortgage Markets in the U.S., FRBSF
EcONOMic LEFIPR (Newsletter No. 20006-03), March 3, 2006, at 2.
64. See Carol Wood, Special Delivery: Japan Post to be Privatized- When the Government Opens Japan's Postal
System to Private Entities, More Than 200 Trillion Yen of Personal Savings Will be Ripe for Picking, Bus. WEEK
ONLINE, April 5, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/apr2006/pi20060405-205672.
htm (noting that Goldman Sachs has "projected that by year-end 2010, total mutual fund balances held
through lJapan'sl postal offices could total over $60 billion, if sales follow the same pattern as" when the
former ban on mutual fund sales by banks was lifted in 1998).
65. As a part of a 1999 ministerial program ostensibly aimed at reforming the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Program (FILP), Japan Post was incorporated in April 2003 with the government's postal businesses then
controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. See Ministry of Finance, Framework of
the Fundamental Reform of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) (provisional translation, 1999),
available at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/zaito/zaeO55.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (for an overview of the
1999 reform effort of the FILP). Thus, beginning in 2003, Japan's postal system businesses were no longer
owned and operated directly by the government, although they have continued to enjoy substantial subsidies
in an interest-free and tax-free environment.
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wholly owned subsidiaries of JPSHC. Initially, the government will hold 100 percent of
the JPSHC's stock.66 But by October 2017 (the end of the ten-year transition period), the
Act requires JPSHC to put up for public sale all of its shares in two of its subsidiaries (the
savings and life insurance companies), though JPSHC may immediately repurchase the
shares. The mail and branch network businesses will continue to be held as wholly owned
subsidiaries of JPSHC.6 7
The Act also mandates that the government sell most of its shares in JPSHC by 2017,
although it is required to maintain a one-third equity interest even after the transition
period. Under the Act, only the postal savings and life insurance obligations existing in
2017 will continue to be guaranteed by the government, and these grandfathered accounts
will be placed into government bonds. All employees ofJapan Post will lose their status as
"government employees" (but not necessarily their jobs), and the postal savings and insur-
ance subsidiaries, as well as JPSHC, will be taxed as business corporations. The postal
savings system (PSS) will be required to start contributing to the national deposit insur-
ance system like any other private savings institution. Finally, the postal savings and in-
surance subsidiaries will be given special licenses enabling them to conduct a full range of
business activities, domestically and internationally. The details of the implicit govern-
ment guarantees and the licenses, however, have yet to be delineated.
1. Privatization Debate
Those favoring privatization (including many economists), argue that to meet the cur-
rent and future requirements of Japan's economic growth, the existing structure and size
of Japan Post must be made more efficient and profitable.6 One catalyst driving the
reform effort is that Japan's rapidly aging population is creating an increasingly higher
ratio of individuals who strain government resources for pensions and healthcare.69 Ja-
pan's GDP per capita is likely to decline unless these demographic changes are offset by
increased productivity. Japan's staggering national debt, which it incurred during its long
recession, already exceeds 164 percent of its GDP.70 While the economic and structural
reforms that began in the 1990s with the Big Bang movement have succeeded in incre-
mentally moving Japan toward a more market-driven economy and further away from its
postwar quasi-socialist system-in which competition was managed by elite bureaucrats
through administrative guidance, and capital was allocated without reference to risk-the
66. Japan Postal Services Privatization Law, Law No. 97 (Oct. 21, 2005), art. 5.
67. Id. In a clarification to the final bills that were passed in October 2005, both the mail delivery company
and the network of branch post offices will be required to maintain "universal service," and will not be
allowed to close rural branches or more remote delivery sites, even if they prove unprofitable.
68. See, e.g., Cargill & Scott, mpra note 63, at 2; Edward J. Lincoln, Arthritic Japan-The Slow Pace of
Economic Reforn 207 (2001) ("[O]ver the next decade, demography creates its own problems, with a shrinking
and aging population leading toward a social security and pension fund crisis. A poorly performing economy
will not be in good shape to cope with this looming problem.").
69. In 2000, the ratio in Japan of "productive members" to "dependent members" stood at 4 to 1. But by
2050, this ratio is projected to drop to 1.5, which is approximately 4 productive members to every 2.5 depen-
dent members. See National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Future Estimated Popula-
tion of Japan (2002).
70. See International Monetary Fund [IMF] Japan, Staff Report for the 2005 art. IV Consultation, July 26,
2005. By comparison, the U.S. public debt is 63.7% of U.S. GDP. See IMF U.S., Staff Report for the 2005
art. IV Consultation, July 30, 2005.
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last fifteen years of reforms will be frustrated and perhaps completely undermined if the
government continues to subsidize and insulate Japan's postal institutions from market
pressures to become more efficient. In sum, privatization proponents argue that Japan
Post essentially functions as the national bureaucracy's pocketbook, misallocating capital
to boondoggles and public works projects of questionable social value in exchange for
votes. And, because these investments are guaranteed by the government, they expose
Japanese taxpayers to large losses, infusing unreasonable systemic risk into the economy.
Privatization's opponents, on the other hand, have long argued that giving Japan Post's
services completely to the private sector will be too disruptive and throw much of Japan's
infrastructure into disarray. The public is concerned that the quality of mail delivery and
depository services will diminish under a private competition model because it may prove
too tempting for a private company to simply close delivery services and branches that fail
to generate profits. 71 One of the most vociferous opponents to privatization of the postal
system, along with the conservative branch of Japan's powerful Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), is Japan's construction lobby because construction companies are reaping the ben-
efits of the huge public works construction contracts that are financed with interest-free
loans from the postal savings system. Even some financial institutions are opposed to
privatization of Japan Post, primarily because they worry that they won't be able to com-
pete with such a massive corporation, especially if the advantages now enjoyed by the
postal companies are continued. 72
2. Risk of Political Tinkering, Backpedaling, and Collusion
If the Privatization Act has one major flaw, it is that many issues are left unaddressed
and, thus, are susceptible to political tinkering, if not outright manipulation, by Japan
Post's old vested interests. Although Article 2 of the Postal Services Privatization Law
commits Japan to implementing "measures to ensure equivalent conditions of competition
between [the privatized postal entities] and other companies engaged in like businesses,"
certain features of the Act appear to conflict with international best practices on privatiz-
ing state-owned enterprises, as well as Japan's international trade obligations.73
In particular, the Act provides that the government's holdings in the new JPSHC will at
no time drop below 30 percent. Private competitors and foreign investors are concerned
that, given this stipulation in the Act, the affiliated group of entities that formerly com-
prised Japan Post will continue to be the biggest player in Japan's financial system, and
will continue to enjoy implicit government guarantees and financial breaks. Moreover,
although the privatized postal companies will be held in separate subsidiaries, they pose a
classic transfer pricing problem in that it will be difficult to impose a fair-market-value,
arm's length standard on their inter-company dealings, given their brother-sister corpo-
71. Although the Privatization Act requires "universal service", some critics worry that this requirement
may ultimately be lifted.
72. Lawrence White, Yucho: "Whale in a Pond" Makes a Break for Open Waters, EUROMONEY, Nov. 2006, at
1.
73. For example, the Privatization Act fails to delineate "clear, objective criteria upon which the ministers
must base their approvals or upon which the Privatization Commission must base its recommendations to
ensure a level playing field before the Privatized Entities are allowed to expand their range of businesses."
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, Privatization Task Force, Applying Global Best Practices to the
Implementation of the Postal Privatization Laws 12 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter Privatization Task Force].
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rate relationship and their present level of functional integration. Under the Act, PSS and
the life insurance companies will still be able to use the network branches during and after
the implementation period when the privatization is to be complete,74 an advantage that
was not negotiated at arm's length. Although the new subsidiaries will be required to pay
tax and deposit insurance, the Act is silent as to whether the rates will be the same as any
other private institution.
With respect to numerous other points, relationships, and conceivable scenarios, the
Privatization Act is ambiguous and vague, raising genuine concerns that the ostensible
privatization of Japan Post-one of the world's largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs)-
may, in the end, tend to serve Japan's entrenched bureaucratic elites and others with
vested interests in the status quo, perhaps becoming a fiasco reminiscent of the disastrous
privatization of SOEs in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union-a
naive privatization effort that was immediately impaired by collusion and corruption. 75
Although Japan has an infinitely stronger set of complementary institutions than did the
former Soviet satellite countries, 76 there is certainly room within the porous parameters of
74. White, svpra note 72, at 1.
75. See MASAIIIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND INsrIIT.IONAL DIVERSITY
95-117 (StaceyJehlik, English trans., Oxford University Press 2000) (originally published in Japanese by Toyo
Keizai Shinpo Sha, 1995). Discussing the relevance of corporate governance to transition economies, Aoki
states: "As Sergei Braguinski recently warned, the insider control problem in Russia should not be seen by
Japan today as somebody else's problem." Id. at 98. When the communist economies of the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) suddenly collapsed in the early
1990s, the Walrasian Anglo-American system was chosen as "the model" to emulate. Accordingly, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) were rapidly privatized in hopes that a vibrant stock market would surface to
effectively monitor the companies' managers. But clearly that is not what happened. Instead, a monitoring
vacuum was created, resulting in widespread corruption and insider control. Directors of the former SOEs
acquired the majority rights in the newly privatized corporations and then colluded with middle managers
and workers to exact a host of private benefits.
Advocates of privatization had underestimated the lingering legacies of communism. Towards the dusk of
these communist regimes, the Communist Party bureaucrats had already yielded much of the managerial
control over SOEs to their directors. The rank-and-file employees also had acquired extensive vested inter-
ests in the enterprises in the form of job security, housing, pensions, health and childcare, and recreational
facilities. Fearing they would lose their existing privileges, the SOE managers sought other employees as
their allies in an effort to construct collusive empires, free of external monitoring and legal constraints. In the
absence of an independent and powerful privatization agency, like that which reformed East Germany's econ-
omy, it proved very difficult to transfer property rights in the corporations to widely dispersed new share-
holders without making political concessions to those with vested interests and managerial control. Because
the reformers feared that the property rights would inevitably be captured by the omnipresent bureaucrats,
who were accustomed to exacting private benefits under the old communist order, the reformers themselves
were anxious to cut deals. Thus, collusive side agreements became the norm. Moreover, Russian managers
began to enlist the services of the Russian Mafia in order to resolve contract disputes in their favor. In short,
everyone wanted a piece of the crumbling economic pie and the newly privatized corporations were essen-
tially looted as a result. The new corporate insiders were free from market discipline except for possible
bankruptcy. However, even this possibility was mitigated by continued state subsidies that were disguised as
legitimate credits. See id. at 95-96, 98-102.
76. History shows the inherent difficulty of transplanting economic models that have evolved over time in
their own unique environments. Economies tend to be path-dependent; preconditions must exist for there to
be a meaningful change in their direction. In order for a vibrant market for corporate control to be estab-
lished, a receptive institutional environment needs to either be cultivated or already in existence. Comple-
mentary institutions for a market economy include private property rights, legally enforceable contracts,
independent securities regulators, investment banks, securities analysts, rating agencies, and rules or incen-
tives geared toward the full and accurate public disclosure of publicly held corporations' financial state and
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the Privatization Act for collusion and unfair business practices to emerge (or continue).
The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) is sufficiently concerned about
this risk that it has issued a white paper calling for Japan to apply global "best practices" in
hammering out the details of Japan Post's privatization. 77 In particular, the ACCJ advo-
cates compliance with privatization guidelines issued by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).7s
3. Global "Best Practices" and "National Treatment": Will Japan Apply Them in
Implementing Privatization?
The OECD, of which Japan has long been a member, has established nonbinding
guidelines on the corporate governance of SOEs, which arguably represent an interna-
tional benchmark to assist governments in improving the way they perform their owner-
ship (or de facto ownership) functions. 79 At the heart of the guidelines is the OECD's
emphasis on ensuring a "level regulatory playing field" between the privatized entities and
their competitive counterparts in the private sector. In a 2005 policy brief, the OECD
explicitly interpreted this principle with respect to the privatization of Japan Post.s0 After
noting the benefits privatization will confer, the OECD states in its policy brief that the
actual realization of "the desired benefits requires that:
" There should be a level playing field between Postal Savings and Postal Life Insur-
ance and private institutions, including equal treatment under the regulatory
framework.
" Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance should not be allowed to offer new prod-
ucts before the establishment of equal treatment.
" The privatisation, which is to be finished by 2017 at the latest, should aim at a
complete divestiture of the government's holdings in financial services."8'
In addition, the OECD has stated that "[a]t a minimum, equal treatment would require
that-in addition to paying taxes and premiums for deposit and insurance contracts-
Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance would be subject to the same regulatory frame-
work as private institutions."8 2 As detailed by the ACCJ, the Privatization Act, as pres-
ently drafted, does not live up to these OECD criteria for best practices.
performance. The former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe lacked these institutions. Thus, the initial at-
tempts to prophylactically apply the Walrasian model in those countries failed. The actual transition to a
market economy in Russia and Eastern Europe has turned out to be a much slower process than what anyone
expected when-the quick-fix reform efforts began there in the early 1990s. See id. at 95-104, 166-68.
77. See Privatization Task Force, supra note 73.
78. See id. at 5-7, 10-16; see also OECD, Policy Brief Economic Survey ofJapan, at 7 (2005), available at http:H
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/37/34286799.pdf [hereinafter OECD Policy Brief].
79. See OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate Governance of State-Owned Assets, OECD
Guidelines an Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/46/51/34803211 .pdf. (last visited March 26, 2007). Although the guidelines are not legally binding,
they purport to set forth a general consensus on the best international practices and benchmarks.
80. OECD Policy Brief, supra note 78.
81. See id. at 7, col. 1. The IMF has also emphasized "the importance of taking timely steps ahead of full
privatization to ensure fair competition with private institutions." See IMFJapan, Staff Report for the 2005 art.
IV Consultation, (July 26, 2005).
82. OECD, OECD Economic Surveys-Japan, Vol. 2005/3 (March 2005).
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Moreover, the Act appears to fall short of Japan's international trade commitments as a
member of the World Trade Organization 3-in particular, the requirements that Japan,
in privatizing Japan Post, accord "most favored nation" (MFN) status to other VATO
members, and comparable "national treatment" to foreign producers and most foreign
services providers that is no less favorable than the treatment Japan normally affords to its
domestic goods and service providers.84 To the extent the Act and the forthcoming Imple-
menting Rules allow the privatized institutions to continue to enjoy competitive advan-
tages over non-domestic providers of goods and services, the national treatment
requirement may be directly violated. In any event, certain provisions in the Act lack
sufficient detail to establish the level-playing-field environment contemplated by the na-
tional treatment standard.85
In light of the requirement in Article 2 of the Postal Services Privatization Law that
Japan implement measures and rules designed to "ensure equivalent conditions of compe-
tition," the ACCJ advocates that the forthcoming Implementation Rules, the drafting of
which was begun in 2006, explicitly require the following:
0 Measures to ensure that the privatized institutions objectively meet the same li-
censing and supervisory requirements as private-sector financial institutions, in-
cluding requisite risk management and internal control requirements and full
government supervision;
83. One of the fundamental policy objectives underlying the privatization of Japan Post is to allow Japan to
compete more readily in the international marketplace. To this end, the privatization effort should comport
with international law, particularly Japan's commitments under the World Trade Organization's Uruguay
Round Agreements. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATI]. More specifically, implementation of privatization must be
consistent with Japan's obligations under the GATT, as well as the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), and the Agreement on Government Procurement, all of which incorporate the MFN and national
treatment standards in some form. See infra note 84. (Under GATS, national treatment only applies to listed
services, but usually includes financial services.) See General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Uruguay
Round Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex IB, GATT Doc. No. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 1130 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS]; Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 103 (1996).
84. The MFN clause is a "favor one, favor all" nondiscrimination clause that generally requires all WTO
members to provide their best trade terms to all other official members of the WTO. The national treatment
clause, on the other hand, requires WTO members to bestow on all foreign producers and service providers
(regardless of their WTO membership status) the same regulatory treatment that they would ordinarily be-
stow on their domestic producers and service providers. Although GATS only applies the national treatment
standard to listed services, financial services are generally subject to the standard. See GATS, art. XVU Japan,
"Schedule of Specific Commitments," GATS/SC/46 (1994); Japan, "Schedule of Specific Commitments,"
Supp. 3 GATS/SC/46/Suppl.3 (1998).
85. Although Japan has made great strides over the last few decades to embrace the new era of globaliza-
tion, Japan has not been "a progressive force in the WTO," and has a history of placing strict constraints on
foreign investors. Provisions designed to inject market principles into cross-border trade and investment
issues have usually been the result of gaiats (foreign pressure). See LINCOLN, supra note 53, at 14-15; DAN
FENNO HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN, 237-257 (1973) (describing Japan's more liberalized
attitude towards international law as "controlled liberalization."). See also Carol Wood, Special Delivery: Japan
Post to be Privatised, Bus. WEEK ONLINE April 5, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/apr
2006 ("Past efforts by non-domestic money managers to infiltrate the world's second-largest economy have
met with disappointment.").
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" That the privatized institutions be strictly prohibited from expanding their busi-
nesses until such proper licensing criteria are in place and such requirements are
met;
" Objective criteria to ensure that when the current restrictions on the scope of the
privatized institutions' businesses are lifted, the privatized institutions are fully
compliant with the licensing standards imposed on private sector competitors;
* Clear, objective criteria regarding the conditions under which disbursements from
the postal institutions may take place so as to ensure a regulatory playing field and
compliance with Japan's international trade commitments, particularly those under
the GATS;
* Measures to ensure that all transactions between the JPSHC and the privatized
postal entities are conducted on an arm's length basis (consistent with Japan's
transfer pricing regulations in its tax law) to prevent the transfer of risk (and tax
obligations) on a non-market basis;
" Measures to ensure that the privatized institutions do not receive any special tax
exemptions that will provide them with unfair advantages over their competitors;
and
* A transparent rulemaking process, subjecting the Implementing Rules to a mean-
ingful public comment period, including public hearings regarding all recommen-
dations made by the Privatization Commission.8 6
The ten-year formal process for implementing Japan's new Privatization Act is slated to
begin in early 2007. On the surface, Japan appears to be making real headway in adopting
sweeping legal reforms and government initiatives aimed at overcoming traditional prac-
tices, infusing market principles into financial industry regulations, and liberalizing its
institutions from cozy relationships that have proved crippling in Japan's recent past. Ja-
pan's recent economic progress has provoked exclamations that "Japan is back!" How-
ever, the most appropriate question may be, "but for how long?" Whether Japan can
manifest Prime Minister Koizumi's vision of privatizing Japan Post, the largest savings
bank in the world, may answer that question. Hopefully, the ministers and officials in
charge of implementing the Privatization Act and drafting the Implementation Rules will
heed the advice of economist Edward Lincoln, who might conceivably exclaim: "Let the
market do it!"87
m. South Korea 1*
The year 2006 witnessed growing efforts in the Korean public sector to reform some of
the key economic regulations. The common underlying theme of the recent regulatory
86. See Privatization Task Force, supra note 73, at 10-16.
87. See LiNcoLN., supra note 53, at 186.
[The] government's continuing role in industrial policy and its interference in industries and
markets has [sic] not elicited much criticism because so many in society take it for granted. Any
economist who believes in the efficiency of markets must be dismayed by the reality of Japanese
government behavior. One is tempted to shout out, "Let the market do it!"
Id.
Beomsu Kim prepared this section; he is a Partner with the law firm of Shin & Kim, Seoul, Korea.
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reforms has been the promotion of economic efficiency through the enhancement of reg-
ulatory effectiveness and, at the same time, elimination of unnecessary red tape. In line
with these reforms, the Government has sought to improve the transparency of corporate
governance and accountability through amendment of the corporate law section of the
Korean Commercial Code so that the Korean legal system may keep up with firmly estab-
lished legal norms, standards, and principles of Western legal systems.
In addition, noteworthy changes have been made in Korea's bankruptcy and rehabilita-
tion laws in order to effectively, and in a more coherent way, achieve a fair resolution for
all parties. But first and foremost, a recent case from the Supreme Court of Korea is
worth noting in that it serves as the landmark case in addressing the issue of leveraged
buyouts in corporate mergers and acquisitions in Korea.
A. THE LEGITIMACY OF LEVERAGED BuvouTs UNDER KOREAN LAW
The leveraged buyout scheme is one of the most often employed in the practice of
mergers and acquisitions throughout the world. Yet in Korea, the legitimacy of leveraged
buyouts remains uncertain. Against this backdrop, a recent decision from the Korean
Supreme Court 8 provides a modicum of guidance as to the debt financing structure that
the directors of the target company must take pains to avoid in any leveraged buyout
scheme in view of their fiduciary duty.
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court of Korea addressed director liability for a
criminal breach of fiduciary duty under the Korean Criminal Code.8 9 The facts of the
case involve a defendant who organized a special purpose company to acquire a control-
ling block of shares in a target company. The share purchase was debt financed in ex-
change for the granting of a stock pledge on the acquired shares in favor of the lenders.
Upon share acquisition, the defendant caused himself to be elected as the director of the
target company while also causing the target company to provide its corporate assets to
the lenders as collateral in lieu of the stock pledge.
On the issue of whether the defendant's act of causing the target company to provide its
assets as collateral to secure the obligation of the acquiring company breached his fiduci-
ary duty as the director of the target company, the Supreme Court found the defendant
liable for a criminal breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds that: (1) the defendant's act of
encumbering the assets of the target company constituted loss to the target company due
to the company's exposure to the risk of foreclosure on its assets in case of the acquiring
company's default on the debt financing obligation with no consideration flowing back to
the target company; (2) the defendant had the requisite mental state for his criminal
breach of fiduciary duty because he intended to confer a benefit upon the acquiring com-
pany at the expense of the target company; and (3) the approval from the shareholders of
the target company did not constitute a valid defense for the defendant who owed a fiduci-
ary duty solely to the target company, not to its shareholders.
88. Judgment of Nov. 9, 2006, Supreme Court of Korea, 2004 Do 7027.
89. The Korean Criminal Code stipulates that a criminal breach of fiduciary duty shall be committed
where a person who has been entrusted by another to administers the affairs of such other person acts in
breach of his duty owed to such other person and, as consequence of such act in breach, reaps personal gains
or causes another third person to reap such gains and thereby causes harm to such other person. Korean
Criminal Code § 355(2).
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Overall, the case clearly shows that the directors of a company must not utilize the
assets of the company without providing the company with adequate consideration in re-
turn for the newly created risk to the corporate assets. The case also reconfirms the well-
established principle that directors owe their fiduciary duty to the company, not to its
shareholders.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision, there still exists overwhelming uncer-
tainty about what forms a leveraged buyout scheme may take, or how it may be lawfully
structured under Korean law. The conclusion that must be drawn from this case is that
the legitimacy of the leveraged buyout scheme as a whole still needs to be tested in Korea.
B. REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES CONSOLIDATED UNDER A
NEW STATUTE
The statutory framework of Korea's corporate reorganization and bankruptcy law was
fundamentally restructured on March 31, 2005, with the promulgation of the Debtor Re-
organization and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA) (Act No. 7428). The purpose of this law, which
took effect on April 1, 2006, is to consolidate existing bankruptcy and reorganization stat-
utes into a single comprehensive statute applicable to all types of debtors, from large cor-
porations to individuals.
The enforcement of this new Act, which is intended to replace the Bankruptcy Act, the
Corporate Reorganization Act, the Composition Act, and the Individual Debtor Rehabili-
tation Act,90 will bring a number of important changes to the existing systems of bank-
ruptcy and rehabilitation. Significant changes under the DRBA include the following:
1. All types of legal entities, as well as individual persons, will be able to avail them-
selves of the unified reorganization and rehabilitation procedures under the
DRBA.91
2. Under the DRBA, a court will be authorized to issue a comprehensive injunction
against enforcement proceedings by any and all creditors against the assets of the
debtor if the court determines that individual injunctions will be inadequate to
achieve the purposes of the reorganization. Upon the issuance of a comprehensive
injunction, enforcement proceedings already underway will be suspended pending
further instruction from the court. Furthermore, the court will be authorized to
cancel such enforcement proceedings where such action is deemed necessary for
the continuance of the debtor's business. On the other hand, if the court deter-
mines that a creditor may sustain irreparable damage as a result of a comprehen-
sive injunction, the court may revoke the injunction with respect to that particular
creditor. 92
3. The DRBA preserves the current system of providing for the appointment of a
permanent receiver subject to the supervision of the court in reorganization proce-
dures. In addition, however, the new statute provides that, in principle, the debtor
90. The Debtor Reorganization and Bankruptcy Act, addendum art. 2.
91. Id. at arts. 34, 294, 579.
92. Id. at arts. 43-45.
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under reorganization or its representative, rather than a third party, should be
designated as the receiver.93
4. The compulsory declaration of bankruptcy in reorganization procedures is limited
to cases involving a final decision to terminate reorganization procedures follow-
ing the approval of the reorganization plan. Declaration of bankruptcy is optional
in any case involving: (1) dismissal of a petition for the commencement of reor-
ganization procedures; (2) failure to gain approval for a reorganization plan; and
(3) receipt of a court order to terminate reorganization procedures prior to the
approval of a reorganization plan. 94
5. The DRBA makes it easier for a court to avoid debtor's transactions with certain
shareholders or equity holders who are related to the debtor (specially related per-
sons), by presuming that the specially-related persons acted knowingly in such
transactions. Whereas the old Bankruptcy Act provided for the avoidance of acts
relating to nonobligatory grants of security or extinguishment of obligations
within sixty days prior to insolvency, the DRBA extends this sixty-day period to
one year in the case of transactions with specially-related persons. Similarly, the
DRBA extends the current avoidance period from sixty days to one year for gratui-
tous transfers of assets to specially-related persons without the exchange of fair
value.95
6. The DRBA features a number of new provisions intended to contribute to the
preservation of the value of an insolvent company by facilitating mergers and ac-
quisitions in the context of corporate reorganization. Such measures are expected
to fill serious gaps in current law, which include only procedures for identifying
and confirming creditors and a system for retiring the shares of the insolvent com-
pany. Among others, the new provisions include the following:
(i) Under the DRBA, a company undergoing reorganization procedures may
enter into a business transfer agreement with court permission even prior to
court approval of such company's reorganization plan.96
(ii) Where a reorganization plan provides for the liquidation of an insolvent com-
pany, the DRBA provides that court approval will require the approval of only
80 percent of the secured creditors of such company.97.
7. The DRBA incorporates a new provision preventing a bankruptcy trustee or
debtor-in-possession from exercising its rights of avoidance or termination with
respect to: (1) certain types of payments designated by the Governor of the Bank
of Korea, and (2) payments made in connection with close-out netting agreements
entered into in connection with certain securities or derivatives-related transac-
tions conducted pursuant to a master agreement (except where it is determined
that the contract parties entered into the relevant transaction for the purpose of
avoiding payments to the creditors of the insolvent party).98
93. Id. at art. 74(2).
94. Id. at arts. 286, 288.
95. Id. at arts. 100-01.
96. Id. at art. 62.
97. Id. at art. 237.
98. Id. at art. 120.
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8. The DRBA introduces provisions dealing with foreign and cross-border insol-
vency and bankruptcy proceedings in a separate chapter. Prominent features
include:
(i) Whereas the old Korean insolvency laws did not recognize insolvency pro-
ceedings initiated outside Korea for assets located in Korea, the DRBA will
permit the receiver or trustee appointed in a foreign insolvency proceeding to
file a petition with a Korean court to commence an insolvency proceeding
under Korean law.99
(ii) Under the DRBA, Korean courts will be authorized to order the suspension
of litigation or other proceedings related to the disposition of a foreign
debtor's business or other assets located in Korea where one or more ap-
proved insolvency proceeding is already taking place outside Korea. Simi-
larly, Korean courts may enjoin a debtor from repaying creditors or otherwise
disposing of its Korean assets pending the resolution of approved foreign in-
solvency proceedings. 100
(iii) In cases involving multiple approved foreign insolvency proceedings, the
DRBA permits Korean courts to consolidate all such proceedings to minimize
the inefficiency that would result if all such proceedings were conducted inde-
pendently. Alternatively, the DRBA authorizes Korean courts to designate
one main action after taking the debtor's location and the interests of credi-
tors into account 01
(iv) To prevent the depletion of the foreign assets of a debtor involved in insol-
vency proceedings in Korea, the DRBA authorizes a receiver or trustee to be
appointed in the domestic action to exercise its authority with respect to such
assets outside Korea to the extent permitted under the laws of the applicable
foreign jurisdiction.102
(v) The DRBA also ensures equal treatment of Korean and foreign creditors in
the insolvency proceedings initiated both in and outside Korea.' 03
C. CORPORATE LAW REFORMS PROPOSED BY KOREAN GOVERNMENT
On October 4, 2006, the Ministry of Justice proposed a number of amendments to the
corporate law provisions of the Commercial Code by way of announcement of legislative
proceedings for the Commercial Code amendment. The most important element of the
proposed amendments is the introduction of a Western-style executive officer system.
Under the proposed legislation, companies will be permitted to choose between the
existing representative director system and the new executive officer system. 104 Under the
existing system, the board of directors typically plays an active role in day-to-day manage-
ment under the formal supervision of one or two representative directors. By contrast, for
99. Id. at arts. 629, 631-32.
100. Id. at art. 636.
101. Id. at art. 639.
102. Id. at art. 640.
103. Id. at arts. 641-42.
104. The Department ofJustice, The Major Aspects as for the Proposed Amendments to the Commercial Code, at 1,
(Oct. 4, 2006).
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companies that adopt the new executive officer system, managerial responsibility will be
distributed among a group of executive officers including a CEO, CFO, CTO, COO, etc.,
while the role of the board of directors will be restricted to more significant matters such
as the issuance of bonds or shares.
The formal introduction of an executive officer system is expected to improve the ac-
countability of management to companies and to provide foreseeability to third parties. 10 5
Under the existing system, liability for mismanagement is, in principle, borne by the regis-
tered directors. In practice, however, a separate category of unregistered directors is per-
mitted to take part in management without any clear liability for their actions. For
companies that adopt the executive officer system, civil and criminal liability for misman-
agement will be borne by the executive officers that were best positioned to prevent such
mismanagement in the first place. 10 6 If shareholders suffer damages as a result of fraud,
conflict of interest, or other criminal or tortious acts of mismanagement, the principal
defendants in any ensuing litigation will be the company's executive officers themselves
(and, where applicable, the board of directors).
Although companies will be initially given the option to choose between the two sys-
tems, it is expected that the executive officer system will be adopted by more companies in
response to pressure from lenders and shareholders that prefer the enhanced accountabil-
ity offered by the executive officer system.
Other significant amendments of the proposed corporate law include:
" Standing to file a derivative action against the directors of a subsidiary will be ex-
tended to minority shareholders of the parent company as long as the shareholding
of the parent company in the relevant subsidiary exceeds 50 percent. To qualify,
the minority shareholders bringing the derivative action must hold at least 1 per-
cent of the issued and outstanding shares of the parent company.107
" Restrictions on self-dealing by directors will be extended to cover transactions be-
tween a company and (1) a director's spouse, (2) parents and children of a director,
(3) parents and children of a director's spouse, and (4) companies (including sub-
sidiaries) in which any of the foregoing parties hold more than 50 percent of the
voting stock, whether individually or jointly. 108 As under existing law, transactions
between a company and any of the subject parties will be permitted only where: (1)
the terms of the transaction are fair and (2) the board of directors approves the
transaction in advance.
* In order to attract top talent and to encourage aggressive management practices,
companies will be permitted to adopt shareholder resolutions indemnifying direc-
tors and certain officers against liability for violations of law or the company's con-
stitutional documents (except for gross negligence or willful misconducts) up to a
fixed limit. In the case of a director, indemnification will be allowed up to a limit
of six times the amount of the director's compensation for the most recent year. 10 9
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. at 5.
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* The range of permitted corporate forms will be expanded to include U.S.-style
limited partnerships (LPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs). It is expected
that these new corporate forms will be widely utilized by private equity funds, ven-
ture capital companies, and venture companies as well as SMEs, among others." 0
Following a public comment period, the enactment is expected to occur as early as the
first half of 2007.
IV. South Korea 11*
A. SECURITIES
1. Securities and Exchange Law
Effective as of March 30, 2006, an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law (1)
allows listed companies to acquire shares which are held by a trustee in trust form for the
benefit of the company as treasury stocks upon the termination of the trust agreement;"'1
(2) restricts officers and employees of securities companies, who avoided sanctions by re-
tiring before the sanctions were issued, from serving as officers for a specified period of
time;112 and (3) introduces certain restrictions when offering stock options to employees
based on board resolutions (e.g., directors are excluded as permissible recipients of such
stock options)."13
2. Presidential Decrees of Securities and Exchange Law, Futures Trading Law, and Indirect
Asset Management Business Law
Effective as of January 30, 2006, amendments to the Presidential Decrees of Securities
and Exchange Law, Futures Trading Law, and Indirect Asset Management Business Law
mandate that investors who plan to acquire shares of securities companies, future compa-
nies, or asset management companies, thereby becoming the controlling shareholder (i.e.,
largest shareholders, specially-related parties of the largest shareholder, and major share-
holders) of such companies under such laws, are required to obtain prior approval from
the Financial Supervisory Commission. 114
3. Indirect Investment Asset Management Business Act (IJAMBA)
Amendments to the IAMBA made a number of changes providing additional flexibility
for funds. Among the most significant changes: (1) local distributors of funds, such as
banks, securities companies, and insurance companies, may delegate fund solicitation ac-
tivities to qualified insurance planners and investment counselors;" s (2) domestic finds
110. Id. at 10.
* Timothy J. O'Brien prepared this section; he is with Kim & Chang, Seoul, Korea.
111. Securities and Exchange Law, No. 7762 (2006), art. 189-2, para. 1, item 3.
112. Id. at art. 33, para. 2, item 6.
113. Id. at art. 189-4, para. 3.
114. Presidential Decree No. 19300 Gan. 30, 2006), art. 18; Presidential Decree No. 19301 (Jan. 30, 2006),
art. 10-3; Presidentical Decree No. 19302 (Jan. 30, 2006), art. 13-2.
115. Presidential Decree No. 19455 (Apr. 27, 2006), art. 55, para. 1, item 6.
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can invest 20 percent (up from 5 percent) of their assets in offshore funds (domestic funds
that delegate management of more than 95 percent of their fund assets to a foreign asset
manager are deemed offshore funds for this purpose); 116 (3) domestic funds can invest 30
percent (up from 10 percent) of their assets in commercial paper issued by government-
invested institutions and financial institutions;' 1 7 (4) domestic funds can invest in futures
and derivatives traded in any of the sixty-four countries with which Korea has tax treaties
(previously limited to the thirty OECD countries);" 8 and (5) the 50 percent limit on
investing in fumds managed by a single manager, which applies to funds of funds, would
not apply if the invested funds are managed by foreign asset managers." l9
B. TAx
1. Corporate Income Tax Law (CITL)
The following amendments to CITL became effective on December 31, 2005: (1) the
existing definition of a "domestic corporation" was expanded to include "a corporation
having an effective management place of business in Korea on or after January 1, 2006"
(previously only a corporation with a head office or principal office in Korea was cov-
ered);1 20 and (2) if a resident distributes investment income (e.g., dividends, interest, capi-
tal gains from share transfer, etc.) to a foreign corporation located in one of the
jurisdictions designated by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (as of now, only the
Federal Territory of Labuan, Malaysia, has been so designated), taxes on such income will
first be withheld in accordance with domestic tax law unless advance approval is obtained
from the tax authorities. 12 1 The foreign corporation can file for a refund within three
years by submitting documents proving that it is a beneficial owner of the income.' 22
2. International Tax Coordination Law (ITCL)
The ITCL was partially revised on May 24, 2006 to prevent international tax avoidance
by applying the substance-over-form principle to international transactions. 2 3 The sub-
stance-over-form principle refers to the theory that tax law and tax treaties should be
applied to the beneficial owner of the relevant income. Prior to the amendment, there
was uncertainty as to whether the legal substance, which focuses on the legal form of the
transaction chosen by a taxpayer, or the economic substance, which focuses on the eco-
nomic effect of the transaction, should be the relevant standard when applying the sub-
stance-over-form principle for Korean tax purposes. The revised ITCL specifies that the
economic substance should be the basis for applying the substance-over-form principle to
international transactions. 24
116. Id. at art. 72, item 3.
117. Id. at art. 73, items 2-4.
118. Id. at art. 8.
119. Id. at art. 70, para. 3, item 1.
120. Corporate Income Tax Law, No. 7838 (2005), art. 1, para. 1.
121. Id. at art. 98-5, para.l.
122. Id. at para. 2.
123. International Tax Coordination Law (ITCL), No. 7956 (2006), art. 2-2.
124. Id.
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Another amendment to the ITCL redefines special relationship for purposes of the
transfer pricing rules125 Prior to the amendment, a special relationship was recognized in
the case where one party can, in substance, control the business policy of another party
(Effective Control Relationship Requirement), or a common interest is deemed to exist
between the two parties (Common Interest Relationship Requirement). The revised
ITCL, however, states that a special relationship can be deemed to exist only in the case
where both of the above relationship requirements are satisfied.126
C. TELECONMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTION ACT (EFTA)
EFTA, which regulates the operation of the electronic finance business of non-financial
institutions, was passed by the National Assembly on April 28, 2006, and became effective
on January 1, 2007. Under EFTA, non-financial institutions may engage in the electronic
finance business after taking the following steps: (1) eligible companies (i.e., joint stock
companies whose paid-in capital is KRW 5 billion or more) must obtain approval from the
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) before engaging in the issuance and manage-
ment of electronic cash;127 (2) eligible companies must register with the FSC and must
meet the minimum requirement of paid-in capital or fundamental assets before engaging
in electronic money transfers, issuance and management of debit electronic payment in-
struments, issuance and management of pre-paid electronic payment instruments, pay-
ment gateway, and other electronic finance business. 128 For the electronic cash business,
approval should be obtained by March 31, 2007; for other businesses registration should
be completed by June 30, 2007.129
D. HuMAN RESOURCES-TRADE UNION AND LABOR RELATIONS ADJUSTMENT ACT
On September 11, 2006, the Tripartite Commission-comprised of management, labor,
and government representatives-reached agreement on revision of the country's labor
and employment laws in an effort to improve the framework of industrial relations. 30
The following are the key changes:
" The implementation date for allowing multiple unions to be formed at one com-
pany and prohibiting employers from supporting wage payments to full-time union
officers will be delayed for three years to January 1, 2010.13 1
" Compulsory government arbitration of labor disputes at businesses classified as es-
sential public works will be abolished. In exchange, (1) more business categories
will be added to the list of essential public works, including air transportation; and
(2) some core duties at essential public works businesses which affect the public
interest will be required to be performed even during strikes. 132
125. Id. at art. 2, para. 1, item 8.
126. Id.
127. Electronic Finance Transaction Act, No. 7929 (2007), art. 28, para. 1.
128. Id. at para. 2.
129. Id. at addendum 3, para. 1, 2.
130. Proclamation of Tripartite Grand Agreement for the Advancement of Labor-Management Relations
(Sept. 11, 2006).
131. Ministry of Labor, Public Announcement No. 2006-160 (Sept. 14, 2006).
132. Id.
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* Businesses classified as essential public works will be permitted to replace striking
workers with new hires, subcontracted workers, or dispatched workers during
strikes. 33 Such actions are prohibited under the current law.
" Even where the collective bargaining agreement has provided for a union shop, a
company will no longer be permitted to terminate or otherwise penalize an em-
ployee for withdrawing from the union.1 34
V. Malaysia*
Throughout 2006, Malaysia continued the process of privatization initiatives begun six
years ago, and continued to encourage foreign direct investment in the country. The
focus of the government has been to continue the transformation of Malaysia from an
agricultural/raw materials-based society, into an industrial society, and finally into a
knowledge-based economy (K-Economy), in line with the Vision 2020 initiative, which
strives to transform Malaysia into a developed nation by the year 2020.135 Among the
long-term strategic plans adopted over the last six years are:
* The Financial Sector Master Plan, intended to establish a competitive, dynamic,
and resilient financial system. 136
* The Capital Market Master Plan, for the comprehensive development of the capi-
tal market;137 and
• The Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan, which entails making the paradigm
shift from a production-based economy to one that utilizes knowledge, creativity,
and innovation to generate stronger economic growth. 138
A. MOVING FORWARD-THE NINTH MALAYSIA PLAN (9MP)139
In line with the initiatives mentioned above, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Hon-
orable Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, announced the 9MP at the beginning of 2006,
which is intended to revitalize Malaysia's economy. The macroeconomic strategies of the
133. Id.
134. Id.
* Norwen Shahredza Mohamad Ghazali and Murzali Mohd Ali prepared this section; both are with Azmi
& Associates, Malaysia.
135. The Honorable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister, Address at the Second
World Knowledge Conference (Mar. 8, 2000) (transcript available at www.globalknowledge.org).
136. The Financial Sector Master Plan was released by Bank Negara Malaysia on March 1, 2001. Bank
Negara Malaysia, Financial Sector Master Plan, available at http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=20 (2001).
137. The Capital Market Master Plan was released in Feb. 2001 by the Securities Commission. Securities
Commission, Capital Market Master Plan, available at http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/cmp/reports.html
(2001).
138. The Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan was prepared by the Institute of Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies Malaysia under the guidance of a steering committee chaired by the Ministry of Finance. It
was released by the Minister of Finance on Sept. 6, 2002. Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Malaysia, Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan, available at http://www.epu.jpm.my/new%20folder/pub-
lication/knoweco.htn (2002).
139. The Ninth Malaysia Plan is available at http://www.epu.jpm.my/rm9/htmVenglish.htm [hereinafter
9MP]. See The Honorable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister, Malaysia, Speech
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9MP include: (1) higher contribution from the private sector and government-linked
companies (GLCs); (2) attracting quality foreign direct investment (FDI); (3) accelerating
progress into the high-end technology sector; (4) promoting new growth in agriculture,
manufacturing, and the services sector; and (5) broadening the K-Economy. 140 The
budget sum allocated under the 9MP is RM 200 billion, with an additional RM 20 billion
for the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).141 According to the Prime Minister, the 9MP is
projected to bring about annual average growth of 6 percent over five years from 2006.142
B. IMPLEMENTING PFI IN MALAYSIA' 43
In the 9MP, the government announced that PFIs would be introduced in the imple-
mentation of privatized projects. 144 Previous PFIs were plagued by rumors of corruption,
nepotism, cronyism, and "bail-out-ism", whereby government projects undertaken by the
private sector which ran into trouble would be bailed out by the government, leaving the
government and the people of Malaysia with unfinished projects or shoddy workmanship
for public utilities and amenities. 145
The government has defined PFI as involving the transfer of the responsibility to fi-
nance and manage capital investment and services in relation to public sector assets to the
private sector in return for lease charges that commensurate with the quality of services
and an amount sufficient to ensure returns on investment. 146 The PFI mode is expected
to finance some RM20 billion of the country's infrastructure development over the next
five years.' 47
The 9MP sets out certain key principles with respect to the PFI program. In particular,
some of the terminologies used are: 148
Key Performance Indicators (KPI): All privatized projects will have output specifica-
tions and KPIs. In other words, privatized entities will be given performance
targets.149
to the Dewan Rakyat at the Tabling of the Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006-2010 (Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter
Prime Minister's Tabling Speech].
140. Prime Minister's Tabling Speech, supra note 139, at 9-10, § 12.
141. Id. at 50, § 105.
142. Id. at 12, § 17.
143. Id. at 22, § 40.
144. The 9MP defines PH as involving the transfer of the responsibility to finance and manage capital
investment and public sector services to the private sector in return for lease charges that reflect the level,
quality, and timeliness of the service provided throughout the concession period and ensure a sufficient return
on investment. See Government Introduces PFI for Implenenting Privatisation Projects, BERNAMA NEWS REP.,
Mar. 31, 2006. The structure of the lease rental payment for PFI projects will guarantee a total return to the
concessionaire of its capital investment expenditures, including financing costs, and a profit to investment; in
exchange the asset and facilities will be transferred to the public sector at the expiry of the concession period.
See 9MP, supra note 139, § 10.22, ch. 10, at 230.
145. The Honorable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister, Malaysia, Speech at the
Kuala Lumpur Business Club Dinner (April 24, 2006).
146. Government Introduces PFI for Implementing Privatisation Prjects, BI RNAMA NEWS REP., Mar. 31, 2006.
147. Prime Minister's Tabling Speech, supra note 139, at 50, § 105.
148. Id.
149. 9MP, supra note 139, at 230.
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" Reward and Penalty System: Payments to privatized entities will be linked to their
performance. Deductions will be made to penalize entities that fail to meet these
targets. 50
" Maintenance: Privatized entities will be expected to manage and maintain facilities
throughout the duration of the concessions. This will introduce the concept of
"whole-life costing" to the projects. Therefore, the design of new facilities must
incorporate the lowest possible maintenance costs.' 5'
* Public Sector Comparator (PSC): All proposals by the private sector will be compared
to a public sector comparator (i.e., costing prepared by public works) for each pro-
ject. This is to introduce the concept of value for money. The private sector's
proposals must offer better value for money than those that the public sector could
have offered.' 52
* Financing mechanism: The purpose of this provision is to enable the government to
tap the private sector financing sources and provident funds. 153
" Risk distribution: The government seeks to ensure that the private sector assumes
the major risks involved in design, construction, operations, and maintenance.
Privatized entities will now have to ensure that the facilities built are functional and
must also deliver the services for the duration of the concession periods. 154
• Capacity-building: This refers to the creation of effective training programs to pro-
vide the public sector officers the technical knowledge in project evaluation and
performance auditing. 15S
The 9MP represents a paradigm shift in thinking. The PFI program under the 9MP
will see a stronger working relationship between the government and the private sector.
In addition to providing financing, the private sector is expected to bear some of the risks
of projects too. Thus, the government will no longer guarantee a bail-out for private
sector projects that fail, and the stricter requirements and penalties should ensure that
only the best qualified and most capable will be awarded such projects.
C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARBITRATION AcT 2005156
As part of the initiative to further encourage foreign investment in Malaysia, and the
desire to increase the attractiveness of Malaysia as a seat for commercial arbitration, the
New Arbitration Act 2005, Act 646 (New Act) came into effect on the March 15, 2006.157
The New Act repeals two previous Acts, namely the preceding Arbitration Act 1952 (1952
Act) and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Act 1985. However, the 1952 Act will continue to apply to arbitral proceedings that were
commenced prior to the operative date of the New Act.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 230, § 10.22, ch. 10.
152. Id. at 230, § 10.23, ch. 10.
153. Id. at 231, § 10.24, ch. 10.
154. Id. at 231, § 10.26, ch. 10.
155. Id. at 231, § 10.28, ch. 10.
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The New Act embodies major provisions that are contained in the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law). 5 8 In 1985, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly recommended "that all States give due consideration to the [adoption of
the] Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in view of the desirability of
uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international com-
mercial arbitration practice." 59 Nevertheless, the New Act is not a verbatim transposi-
tion of the Model Law into Malaysian law. In particular, there are a number of important
issues arising from the New Act of which to be aware.
1. Court Intervention
Section 8 of the New Act states that "[ulnless otherwise provided, no court shall inter-
vene in any of the matters governed by this Act." 160 This section ensures that the inde-
pendence of the arbitration is preserved, and that the arbitral proceedings will not be
usurped by the court. Nevertheless, under the New Act, the court retains some functions
in various matters, including the granting of interim measures of protection (Section 11);
providing assistance in taking evidence (Section 29); setting aside the award on the basis
that the same is in conflict with public policy (Section 37); recognizing and enforcing
awards of a domestic arbitration or from a foreign State (Section 38); and in relation to
domestic arbitration, the determination of a preliminary point of law (Section 41).
2. Applicable Law of the Arbitration
Section 30(1) of the New Act provides that in a domestic arbitration, the arbitral tribu-
nal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the substantive law of Malaysia.161 For an
international arbitration, however, the dispute is to be decided in accordance with the law
as agreed upon by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute, or, in the
absence of such agreement, in accordance with Malaysian conflict of laws rules.162 It
would appear that under the New Act, parties to a domestic arbitration are not entitled to
choose the substantive law that will govern their dispute. This is a departure from the
previous position under the 1952 Act, which allowed parties to do so.
VI. The Philippines*
In 2006, there were significant legal developments in the Philippines in the following
areas: (1) investments; (2) real estate; (3) criminal law and human rights; and (4) political
and constitutional law.
158. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-5467 1_Ebook.pdf.
159. G.A. Res. 40/72, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985).
160. Arbitration Act 2005, Act 646, § 8 (2005) (Malay.).
161. Id. § 30(1).
162. Id. §§ 30(2), (4).
* Albert Vincent Y. Yu Chang and Ben Dominic R. Yap prepared this section. Albert Vincent Y. Yu
Chang is an attorney with Warner Norcross & Judd LLP in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Ben Dominic R. Yap is
a Partner with Caguioa & Gatmaytan in Makati City, Philippines.
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A. INVESTMENTS
The Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (Revised Rules) of the Build-Operate
Transfer (BOT) Law163 took effect on April 13, 2006. The BOT Law authorizes the
financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure projects' 64 by the
private sector. The Revised Rules aim to further encourage domestic and foreign private
investments in infrastructure projects by providing: (1) a climate of minimum government
regulation; (2) reasonable returns on investments; (3) transparency and competitiveness in
the bidding and award of projects; (4) appropriate sharing of risks between the govern-
ment and project proponents; (5) coordination between national government and local
government units; and (6) compliance by the government and the project proponents with
their obligations and undertakings.
65
The revisions relate to, among other things, the qualifications of project proponents
and the administrative processes. Among the salient revisions are the following: (1) invita-
tions to pre-qualify and bid must be posted on the website of the agency or local govern-
ment unit concerned; 166 (2) for projects consisting at least US$10 million, the invitation
may be published in international publications; 167 (3) the project proponent may enter
into a management contract with a wholly foreign-owned entity for the day-to-day opera-
tions of the facility;' 68 (4) the appropriate government agency or local government unit
shall determine the appropriate rate of return for the project; 169 (5) accreditation require-
ments for foreign contractors are amended; 170 and (6) the Philippine government may
provide direct and indirect support or contribution, such as direct government subsidy,
direct government equity, performance undertaking, or legal and security assistance.'
71
163. An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure
Projects by the Private Sector and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 6957, (July 9, 1990) (Phil.); An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Con-
struction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector and for Other Pur-
poses," Rep. Act No. 7718 (May 5, 1994) (Phil.).
164. Rep. Act 6957, as amended, § 2. Under the BOT Law, private sector investment in infrastructure
projects may by carried out in one of several schemes: (1) Build-and-Transfer; (2) Build-Lease-Transfer; (3)
Build-Operate-Transfer; (4) Build-Own-Operate; (5) Build-Transfer-Operate; (6) Develop-Operate-and-
Transfer; (7) Rehabilitate-Operate-and-Transfer; and (8) Rehabilitate-Own-Operate.
165. NAT'L ECON. & DEV. AUTH., IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A. NO. 6957, AS
AMENDED BY R.A. No. 7718, "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE FINANCING, CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECrS BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES", AS
AMENDED BY R.A. No. 7718, § 1.1 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Phil.), available at http'J/www.neda.gov.ph/references.
asp#RA.
166. Id. § 5.2.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 5.4.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 13.3.
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B. REAL ESTATE-RENT CONTROL
On December 21, 2005, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law
the Rent Control Act of 2005 (RCA).172 Effective until December 31, 2008,173 the RCA
limits the increase in the rent of specified residential units to no more than 10 percent
annually.174 This cap in rent applies to residential units in Metro Manila and other highly
urbanized cities where the total monthly rent does not exceed 10,000 pesos, and to resi-
dential units in all other areas where the monthly rent does not exceed 5000 pesos.175
This cap applies only as long as the same lessee occupies the unit; when the unit is vacated
by the occupant, the lessor may charge a new rate for the next occupant.176 The RCA also
provides the lessee with additional protection, including provisions that: (1) a lessee can-
not be ejected on the ground that the leased premises have been sold or mortgaged to a
third person, whether or not the lease or mortgage is registered;177 (2) a lessor cannot
demand more than one month advance rent and more than two months deposit; 178 and (3)
lessee may only be ejected judicially on grounds specified under the RCA.179 A violation
of the RCA may be penalized with a fine or imprisonment. 80
C. CRIMINAL LAW AND HuMAN RIGHTS
Recent criminal law developments have advanced the human rights of both criminal
offenders and victims.
1. Abolition of Death Penalty
The Philippines recently joined the ranks of 124 other countries (including twenty-four
other countries in the Asia Pacific region)' 8' that have abolished capital punishment either
in law or in practice. 82 On June 24, 2006, President Arroyo signed the Death Penalty
172. An Act Establishing Reforms in the Regulation of Rent for Certain Residential Units, Providing for the
Mechanisms Therefore and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9341(Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.
senate.gov.ph/republicacts/RA%209341 .pdf.
173. Id. § 17.
174. Id. § 3.
175. Id. § 11.
176. Id. § 3.
177. Id. § 8.
178. Id. § 5.
179. Id. § 7. Under the RCA, ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds: (1) the leasing or sub-
leasing, in whole or in part of the unit, including acceptance of boarders or bed spacers without written
consent of the owner or lessor; (2) arrears in payment of rent for three months or more; (3) in case of a
legitimate need of the owner or lessor to repossess his property for his own use of that of an immediate family
member as residential unit provided that the lease for a definite period has expired and a formal notice of
three months in advance has been given; (4) the need to make repairs provided that the lessee has a right of
first refusal after repairs have been made; and (5) expiration of the lease period.
180. The RCA imposes a fine of P5,000 to P15,000 or imprisonment of one month and a day to six months.
181. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Public Statement, (June 7, 2006) available at http://www.web.amnesty.
org/library/Index/ENGASA350042006 (last accessed Mar. 5, 2007).
182. Amnesty Int'l, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-
facts-eng (last accessed Mar. 5, 2007). It was the second time that death penalty was abolished in the Philip-
pines: In 1987, the Philippines set a historic precedent when it became the first country in Asia in modem
times to abolish the death penalty for all crimes; however, in 1993, Rep. Act No. 7659 imposed the death
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Law'8 3 which prohibits the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. The Death
Penalty Law reduces the penalty for crimes punished by death to reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Convicts whose sentences have been reduced to reclusion perpetua will not
be eligible for parole.'8 4
2. Juvenile Justice and Welfare
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006185 (Juvenile Act) establishes a juvenile
justice and welfare system that deals with children at risk and children in conflict with the
law. I86 It outlines programs and services for the prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-
integration, and aftercare to ensure the normal development of young offenders.18
7 It
expressly recognizes rights specific to juvenile offenders, including the right not to be
tortured or subjected to other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, and the right not
to be imposed a sentence of capital punishment or life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of release.' 88 Among its key provisions, the Juvenile Act exempts from criminal liabil-
ity a child offender who is fifteen years old or younger at the time of the commission of
the crime. 18 9 It also exempts children who are older than fifteen but younger than eigh-
teen from criminal liability, unless they acted with discernment.' 90
3. Women and Children Victims
To protect the privacy of women and children victims, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the names of women and children victims should be withheld from its decisions.' 91
Furthermore, the Supreme Court added that the personal circumstances of victim-survi-
vors, or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well
as those of their immediate family or household members, should not be disclosed.' 92
D. POLITICAL AND CONSTruIToNAL LAW
While President Arroyo aimed to bring about improvements in national economic per-
formance, her presidency has been hounded by political controversies, including serious
penalty on certain heinous crimes, such as murder, infanticide, kidnapping, and rape; see also CONST. (1987),
art. H, § 19, (Phil.).
183. An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 9346 (June 24,
2006) (Phil.), available at http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic acts/ra%209346.pdf.
184. People v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077, (S.C. Aug. 31, 2006) (Phil.); People v. Quiachon, G.R. No.
170236, (S.C. Aug. 31, 2006) (Phil.); People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, (S.C. Aug. 31, 2006) (Phil.).
185. An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Jus-
tice and Welfare Council Under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9344 (Apr. 28, 2006) (Phil.), available at http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic-acts/RA
%209344.pdf.
186. Id. § 4(m).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 5.
189. id. § 6.
190. Id.
191. People v. Mangimgit, G.R. No. 171270, (S.C. Sept. 20, 2006) (Phil.), People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No.
167693, (S.C. Sept. 19, 2006) (Phil.).
192. Mangimgit, G.R. No. 171270; Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693.
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allegations of electoral fraud. 193 These controversies have caused massive street demon-
strations and a series of congressional investigations. President Arroyo responded with
presidential issuances and initiatives, most of which have been voided by the Philippine
Supreme Court. In so doing, the Supreme Court-dominated by Arroyo-appointees-
demonstrated the independence of the Philippine Judiciary. 194
1. Congressional Investigations in Aid of Legislation
Executive Order No. 464, issued on September 26, 2006, required cabinet members,
police and military generals, senior national security officials, and other officers "as may
be determined by the President" to first seek the President's approval before appearing
before any inquiry of the Senate or the House of Representatives. In the consolidated
cases of Senate v. Ermita,195 Bayan Muna v. Ermita,196 Chavez v. Ermita,197 Alternative Law
Groups, Inc. v. Ermita,198 PDP Laban v. Ermita,199 and Cadiz v. Ermita,200 the Supreme
Court partially voided Executive Order No. 464 to the extent that it infringed on the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials in congressional inquir-
ies in aid of legislation. However, the Supreme Court upheld Executive Order No. 464
insofar as it applies to congressional investigations that do not relate to specific legislation.
Moreover, the Court affirmed the President's right to invoke the executive privilege and
her power to authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, with
a qualification that the right to invoke the executive privilege did not extend to "implied
claims" of privilege by lesser officials.
2. Right to Assembly
At the height of street protests, President Arroyo, through her Executive Secretary,
issued a policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), which instructed the Philippine
National Police (PNP), as well as the local government units, to: (1) strictly enforce a "no
permit, no rally" policy; (2) disperse groups that ran afoul of this standard; and (3) arrest
all persons violating the laws and ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and
demonstrations. The CPR stated that it was in force "in lieu of maximum tolerance."
201
193. Philippine Gov't Dismisses Arroyo's Lower Support Rate, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Sept. 10, 2004, http://
english.people.com.cn/200409/10/eng20040910_156601 .html.
194. See Tj. Burgonio, Senators Praise Justices, Claim Win, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 21, 2006, at
Front Page, available at http://news.inq7.net/nation/index.php?index=l&story-id=73220; Armand N.
Nocum, SC Chief The Only Winner is Justice, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 2006, at Front Page,
available at http://news.inq7.net/nation/index.php?index=l&storyjd=73323.
195. Senate of the Phil. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, (S.C. Apr. 20, 2006), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov.ph/.
196. Bayan Muna v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169659, (S.C. Apr. 20, 2006), available at httpJ/www.supremecourt.
gov.ph/.
197. Chavez v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169660, (S.C. Apr. 20, 2006), available at http-//www.supremecourt.gov.
ph/.
198. Alt. Law Groups, Inc. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169667, (S.C. Apr. 20, 2006), available at http//www.su-
premecourt.gov.ph/.
199. PDP-Laban v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169834, (S.C. Apr. 20, 2006), available at httpJ/www.supremecourt.
gov.ph/.
200. Cadiz v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171246, (S.C. Apr. 20, 2006), available at httpJ/www.supremecourt.gov.ph/.
201. Press Release No. 2, Office of the President (Sept. 21, 2005).
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The CPR was supposedly issued based on the Public Assembly Act of 1985202 (Public
Assembly Act), which adopted a policy of "maximum tolerance."203 The Public Assembly
Act requires a written permit for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly, but does not require a written permit if the assembly will be done in a freedom
park, at a private party, or on the campus of a government-owned and operated educa-
tional institution. 204
In three consolidated cases, Bayan, Karaptan, Kilusang Magbubukid Ng Pilipinas (KMP) v.
Ermita,20 5 Del Prado v. Ermita,206 and Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Lumibao,20 7 the Supreme
Court upheld the Public Assembly Act but struck down the CPR. The Court pointed out
that the Executive Secretary had stated in an affidavit that the CPR is in consonance with
the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3(c) of the Public Assembly
Act, and concluded that because the CPR was consistent with the Public Assembly Act,
the CPR "serves no valid purpose." 208
3. Warrantless Arrests and Presidential Lawmaking Powers
Acting on intelligence reports of an alleged conspiracy to bring down the government,
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1017 on February 24, 2006, declaring a state of
national emergency and commanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) "to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of law-
less violence, as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by [the President] person-
ally or upon [her] direction. " 2°9 Based in part on Proclamation No. 1017, several high
profile personalities-including a respected university professor, a congressman, and a re-
tired general-were arrested without warrants of arrest, and the offices of a newspaper
were searched without a search warrant. 210
202. An Act Ensuring the Free Exercise by the People of their Right Peaceably to Assemble and Petition the
Government for Other Purposes, B.P. Big. 880 (Oct. 22, 1985), available at http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/
bataspam/bp1985/bp_880_1985.html.
203. Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police, and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. Id. § 3(c).
204. An Act Ensuring the Free Exercise by the People of Their Right Peaceably to Assemble and Petition
the Government for Other Purposes, Batas Pambansa Big. 880 (Oct. 22, 1985), available at http://www.
lawphil.net/statutes/bataspam/bp1985/bp-880_-1985.html.
205. Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusand Magbubukid Ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, (S.C. Apr.
25, 2006), available at http'I/www.supremecourt.gov.ph/.
206. Del Prado v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169848, (S.C. Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.
ph/.
207. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169881, (S.C. Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov.ph/.
208. Id.
209. President Arroyo also issued General Order No. 5, directing the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." Proclamation Declaring
a State of National Emergency, Proc. 1017-O.G.-, (Feb. 24, 2006) (Phil.).
210. See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%2ONo.%20171396.htm; Cacho Olivares v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 171409 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/
G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm; Escudero v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171485 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%2ONo.%20171396.htm; Kilusang Mayo
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In the consolidated cases of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,211 Cacho Olivares v. Ermita,212
Escudero v. Ermita,21 3 Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Ermita,214 Alternative Law Group, Inc. v.
Ermita,21S Cadiz v. Ermita,216 and Legarda v. Macapagal-Arroyo,2 17 the Supreme Court de-
clared Proclamation No. 1017 unconstitutional. While the Supreme Court recognized
the power of the President to declare a state of national emergency, it struck down Procla-
mation No. 1017 on the ground that its "extraneous provisions" giving the President ex-
press or implied power to: (1) issue decrees; (2) direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws, including those not related to lawless violence, and all decrees promulgated to the
President; and (3) impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press
are "ultra vires and unconstitutional." 218 As to the warrant-less search of the offices of a
local newspaper, the Court ruled that the President cannot take over privately owned
public utilities or private businesses affected with public interest in the absence of
legislation.2 19
4. People's Initiative to Revise the Constitution
The Arroyo administration also strongly supported an initiative to propose major revi-
sions to the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The initiative mainly advocated a shift from a
bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government; however, the
initiative also proposed (1) an indefinite extension of the term of the members of the lower
house of the Philippine Congress while the proposed shift in form of government is in
transition, and (2) that further amendments to the Constitution may be made by the in-
terim parliament.2 20 In the consolidated cases of Lambino v. Commission on Elections and
Binay v. Commission on Elections, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission on Elections'
dismissal of the initiative to revise the Constitution.2 21 The Supreme Court sternly
warned that "[n]o one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it
in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in
Uno v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171483 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurispru-
dence/2006/may2006/G.R.%2ONo.%20171396.htm; Alternative Law Group, Inc. v. Ermita, G.R. No.
171400 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2OO6/G.R.
%20No.%20171396.hun; Cadiz v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171489 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at htp://www.
supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm; Legarda v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. No. 171424 (S.C. May 3, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
2006/may2006/G.R.% 2ONo.% 20171396.htm.
211. David, G.R. No. 171396.
212. Cacbo Olivares, G.R. No. 171409.
213. Escudero, G.R. No. 171485.
214. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171483.
215. Alt. Law Groups, Inc., G.R. No. 171400.
216. Cadiz, G.R. No. 171489.
217. Legarda, G.R. No. 171424.
218. See, e.g., David, G.R. No. 171396; Cacbo Olivares, G.R. No. 171409; Eitmdero, G.R. No. 171485; Ki-
lusang Mayo Uno, G.R. No. 171483; Alt. Law Group, Inc., G.R. No. 171400; Cadiz, G.R. No. 171489; Legarda,
G.R. No. 171424.
219. Id.
220. Lambino v. Comelec, GR No. 174153 (S.C. Oct. 25, 2006); Binay v. Comelec, GR No. 174299 (S.C. Oct.
25, 2006), both available at http'J/www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/174153.htn.
221. The Supreme Court decision has become final with the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners. Min. Res., G.R. No. 174153, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/(Phil.).
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the Constitution itself."222 The Court explained that major revisions could not be pro-
posed by an initiative because only amendments may be proposed by an initiative. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
[b] icameral-[p]residential to a [u]nicameral-[p]arliamentary system, involving the abolition
of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is 'a revision',
and 'not a mere amendment.' 223 Under the Philippine Constitution, revisions may be
proposed only by (1) Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or (2) a
constitutional convention.224
The Supreme Court also found it objectionable that "proposed changes were not incor-
porated with, or attached to, the signature sheets" when the people were invited to sign. 2 25
Finally, the Supreme Court frowned upon, and labeled as "logrolling," the fact that the
initiative advocated an extension of the terms of the members of the lower house and
proposed a provision that would allow the interim parliament to introduce further amend-
ments or revisions to the Constitution-which the Court characterized as "a subject mat-
ter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government." 226
VII. Thailand*
The widely publicized demonstrations against the Prime Minister and the subsequent
military coup on September 19 made 2006 a turbulent year for Thailand. This unrest set
the stage for some significant government policy changes impacting foreign investment.
The most significant of these policy changes concerns the government's stance with re-
spect to the use of Thai nominee shareholders by foreign investors. The object of this
section is to summarize these changes and to explain their legal significance with respect
to foreign investors in Thailand.
A. THE USE OF NOMINEE SHAREHOLDERS iN THAILAND
Like many developing countries, Thai law makes a distinction between investment by
local Thai companies and investment by foreign companies. 227 The relevance of the dis-
tinction is that the law regulates the types of business activities foreign companies are
allowed to pursue in Thailand.228 Regulated business activities include land ownership, all
retail and wholesale selling, telecommunications, agriculture, all types of services, and
many other activities. 229 Generally, the law stipulates that foreigners seeking to engage in
regulated activities must first seek various government approvals before commencing
operation.2 30
222. Lambino, G.R. No. 174153; Binay, G.R. No. 174299.
223. Id.
224. CONST. (1987), art. XVII, § 1, (Phil.).
225. Id.
226. Id.
* Michael Doyle prepared this section; he is a partner with the law firm of Seri Manop & Doyle, Bang-
kok, Thailand.
227. Foreign Business Act, B.E. 2542 (1999), § 4.
228. Id. at List One, Two, and Three.
229. Id.
230. Id. § 8.
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To avoid the investment of time necessary to apply for these approvals, many foreign
investors have historically utilized Thai nominee shareholders. This means that the for-
eign investors arrange for Thai citizens to hold shares of a Thailand registered company
on the foreigners' behalf, while the true ownership and control of the company resides
with the foreign investor. By doing this, the company appears on paper to be a majority
Thai-held company, and thus not subject to special restrictions. Although Thai law ex-
pressly forbids this practice, 231 the government did not begin to take strong steps to elimi-
nate the practice until 2006 when it issued a series of announcements. These
announcements targeted the use of nominees in Thailand's real estate sector, as well as in
the other regulated sectors as is set forth below.
B. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LAND
Thai law prohibits foreign ownership of land unless prior special permission is obtained
from the government.232 To avoid this prohibition, however, many foreign investors have
historically established companies utilizing Thai nominee shareholders for the specific
purpose of purchasing land. In fact, many resort areas in Thailand such as Phuket and
Koh Samui have experienced a real estate boom in recent years with the vast majority of
the land purchases being made by foreigners.233 On May 15, 2006, however, the govern-
ment began to take significant steps to eliminate this practice. 234
Because the practice of using nominees was already in violation of the law, the steps
taken by the government did not take the form of new legislation, but rather as official
internal memoranda, issued by the Department of Lands to the governors of all of Thai-
land's provinces. 235 The May 15 memorandum stated that "the Interior Ministry has re-
ceived reports that there are foreigners joining with Thais, or employing Thai's to
incorporate companies to engage in the real estate trading business" in violation of the law
and that these Thai shareholders had not actually invested in the company. 236 The mem-
orandum instructed land officials to investigate all land transfers in which it appears that
foreigners may be utilizing Thai's nominees to avoid legal restrictions.
Over the months that followed the issuance of this memorandum to the public, an addi-
tional announcement was issued further clarifying the requirements to be implemented by
land officials when companies with foreign shareholders attempt to purchase land. 237
This action by the government has caused many foreign real estate developers in Thai-
land to change their business models from an ownership structure to a long-term-lease
structure which is permissible by law. The maximum lease period available under Thai
231. Id. § 36.
232. Act Promulgating the Land Code, B.E. 2497 (1954) (last revised 2000), § 86.
233. Many real estate experts in Thailand estimate that over 90% of the purchasers in Thailand's resort
areas are made indirectly by non-Thai purchasers.
234. Memo. Ref. 05i5/1562 dated 15th May 2006 from Department of Lands Office of Land Register




237. Memorandum from Ministry of Interior to Governors of Every Province, Application for Land Be-
longing to a Juristic Person with Foreign Shareholders, Ref. 0515/Wor 2430 (Ouly 21, 2006).
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law is thirty years.23 8 This policy change has caused the real estate sector in these resort
areas to go through a significant adjustment. The long term impact on the sector is not
yet clear.
C. GENERAL BUSINESS
Similar to what occurred with regard to the real estate sector, the government also
issued ministerial regulations targeting the practice of foreigners utilizing Thai companies
as nominee shareholders to engage in all regulated business activities.2 39 These new regu-
lations state:
In the event of the registration of a partnership or company which foreign partner or
shareholder invests in or holds the shares of such partnership or company from 40
percent to 50 percent of the register capital OR in the event the foreign national
invests in or holds the shares of such partnership or company less than 40 percent of
the registered capital, but such foreign national acts as the authorized person of the
partnership or company, all Thai partners or shareholders must submit the evidence
demonstrating the source of fund to supplement to the registration application. The
said documents must show the fund that conforms to the amount being used for
investment or holding the shares of each partner or shareholder as follows:
1. Copy of bank pass book or copy of bank statement in preceding [six] months; or
2. Document issued by the bank which certifies or shows the financial status of the
partner or shareholder; or
3. Copy of evidence showing source of fund being used for investment or holding
shares.2 40
The implications of the above regulations are arguably even greater than those directed
towards the real estate sector alone because they impact all companies utilizing Thai nom-
inee shareholders to avoid legal restrictions, instead of just a single sector.
D. CONCLUSION
In both of the situations described above, the Thai government's intentions seem clear.
Going forward, the government seeks to eliminate the practice of using nominees by more
closely scrutinizing situations where it may appear that foreigners are seeking to utilize
Thai nominees to avoid legal restrictions. What is not yet clear, however, is the govern-
ment's stance with respect to those companies which already hold title to land, and those
companies already in operation in other areas which currently use Thai nominee share-
holders. Many foreign investors fear that these government actions may just be the begin-
ning of additional regulation in this area, ultimately resulting in the elimination of all
companies utilizing nominees. Because the practice of using nominees has been wide-
spread for many years, there is a fear that this would be highly disruptive. To date, the
238. Civil & Commercial Code, § 540 (19-1) (Thail.).
239. Ministerial Regulations, RE: Establishing the Partnership and Company Register Office, Appointing
the Registrars and Prescribing Rules and Procedures for Partnership and Limited Company Registration,
B.E. 2549 (2006) (Thail.).
240. Id.
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Thai government has made no clear indication of how it intends to deal with this issue
moving forward.
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